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Comments
FEDERAL SECTOR ARBITRATION UNDER THE
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978*
This Comment explains and analyzes the various grievance ar-
bitration and other dispute resolution procedures of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1975. The Act creates a confusing maze of
forums empowered to hear and resolve federal sector labor rela-
tions disputes in addition to reviewing supposedly final and
binding arbitration awards. The author stresses the importance
of arbitral finality and urges the courts to exercise restraint
when confronted with arbitration award appeals.
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 19781 replaces Exec-
utive Order No. 114912 as the basic law governing labor relations
* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of the
following persons in the preparation of this Comment: Professor Jerry J. Williams,
Director of the Labor-Management Relations Center at the University of San
Diego School of Law; C. Brian Harris, Chief, Arbitration Division, Federal Labor
Relations Authority; Robert J. Freehling, Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations
Authority; Basil L. Mayes, Senior Labor Relations Advisor, Naval Civilian
Personnel Command, Western Field Division and Stuart M. Foss, Deputy Director
of Labor Relations, Department of Defense. The points of view and opinions
expressed herein, however, are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of any other person.
1. Act of October 13, 1979, Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified at 5
U.S.C.A § 7101 (West Supp. 1979)).
2. 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970) as
amended by Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. § 605 (1971-1975 Compilation) and
Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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for federal sector employees, 3 and gives the federal sector labor-
management relations program a statutory base, exempt from
presidential revision. In some ways the Act parallels the private
sector labor relations program as it exists under the National La-
bor Relations Act.4 However, in other aspects it goes far beyond
the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and state pub-
lic employee collective bargaining statutes.
One of the most novel and important provisions of the new Act
involves the requirement that federal sector collective bargaining
agreements provide for final and binding arbitration of federal
sector labor relations disputes as part of the negotiated grievance
procedure.5 In the private sector, provision for a negotiated griev-
ance arbitration procedure in the parties' collective bargaining
agreement is a negotiable issue-it may be included or excluded
by the parties. Absent a collective bargaining agreement, how-
ever, there is no requirement that federal sector labor relations
disputes be submitted to arbitration. Rather, in the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement, federal sector labor relations dis-
putes must be processed pursuant to a statutory appeal proce-
dure, if one covers the dispute, or pursuant to the agency-
employer's internal grievance procedure, if one exists. Hence, ar-
bitration in the federal sector under the Act does not constitute
compulsory arbitration.
The scope of the negotiated grievance procedure itself is sub-
ject to negotiation in the private sector, and extends only to those
matters which the parties have agreed it shall cover.6 The negoti-
ated grievance procedure in the federal sector collective bargain-
ing agreement automatically extends to all matters covered by
the Act's broad definition of "grievance"7 unless the matter has
3. "Federal sector" refers to the governmental agencies of the United States
and its employees.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-681 (1970).
5. Arbitration is a procedure in which the parties to a dispute voluntarily
agree to be bound by the decision of an impartial or neutral third-party or panel
outside of the judicial process. Labor arbitration is simply the arbitration of a
grievance or dispute between an employer and the union representing his employ-
ees involving the application or interpretation of some term or aspect of the em-
ployment relationship. D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBrrRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 1-2(1979). The term "federal sector labor relations disputes" encompasses federal
employee grievances concerning the interpretation or application of some provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement, and those matters which are subject
to a statutory appeal procedure, such as employment discrimination complaints,
adverse agency actions, prohibited personnel actions, and removals and demotions
for unacceptable performance. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2302, 4303, 7512, 7701, 7702 (West
Supp. 1979).
6. Communications Workers v. New York Tel Co., 327 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964);
D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBrrRATION LAw AND PRACTICE 5 (1979).
7. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7103 (a) (9) (West Supp. 1979).
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been specifically excluded from the scope of the grievance proce-
dure by the parties in their collective bargaining agreement,8 or
by the Act itself.9 Consequently, arbitration extends to a variety
of disputes that were not heretofore covered by the negotiated
grievance procedure in the federal sector. The Act also presents
federal sector employees with a variety of dispute forums for
resolving federal sector labor relations disputes. The federal sec-
tor employee often must make an irrevocable election between
raising the matter under the negotiated grievance arbitration pro-
cedure or of pursuing the matter under a statutory appeal proce-
dure.10
In addition to substantive changes in the federal service labor-
management relations program, the Act makes a variety of orga-
nizational changes. The Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA), modeled after the National Labor Relations Board, re-
places the politicized Federal Labor Relations Council." The
FLRA exists as an independent agency within the executive
branch, and is empowered to decide representation12 and unfair
labor practice cases,13 negotiability disputes,'4 and appeals from
arbitration awards. 15
The purpose of this Comment is to explain and analyze the var-
ious grievance arbitration and other dispute resolution provisions
of the Act. After a brief review of the development of arbitration
in the federal sector, the framework and problems of processing
8. Id. § 7121(c).
9. Id. § 7121(d), (e), which exclude from the coverage of the negotiated griev-
ance procedure grievances concerning: prohibited political activities; retirement,
health or life insurance; suspensions or removals for national security reasons; ex-
amination, certification or appointment; or the classification of any position which
does not result in the reduction in grade or pay of an employee.
10. Id. § 7121(e) (1), which involves such matters as removals or demotions for
unacceptable performance, or adverse agency actions. These matters are appeala-
ble to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
11. Id. § 7104. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) is composed of
three full-time members, one of whom must be an adherent of the political party
not currently in power, and all of whom are appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate and subject to removal only for cause. The Fed-
eral Labor Relations Council (Council) was composed of the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, the Secretary of Labor, and such other officials of the Execu-
tive Branch as the President chose to designate from time to time. Exec. Order
No. 11,491, as amended, § 4, supra note 2.
12. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7105(a) (2) (A)-(C) (West Supp. 1979).
13. Id. §§ 7105(a)(2)(G), 7118.
14. Id. §§ 7105(a) (2) (D), 7117(b), (c).
15. Id. §§ 7105(a) (2) (H), 7122.
federal sector labor relations disputes through the procedural
maze established by the Act for "final and binding arbitration"
are explored. Conclusions will then be drawn with respect to the
adequacy of the changes made by the Act in the federal sector ar-
bitration process and law.
THE EVOLUTION OF BINDING ARBITRATION IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR
In 1962, Executive Order No. 1098816 legitimatized collective bar-
gaining in the federal sector. Executive Order No. 10988 was ini-
tially hailed as a "Magna Carta for Public Employees."17 It
permitted federal agencies to enter into collective bargaining
agreements with employee organizations that exclusively repre-
sented federal employees in appropriate bargaining units. The
agreements could contain negotiated grievance procedures and
provide for advisory arbitration of federal employee grievances,
complaints, and misunderstandings.18 Dissatisfaction with advi-
sory arbitration, which made the decision or recommendation of
the arbitrator subject to the approval of the agency head, and
with the dual system for resolving grievances19 resulted in the is-
suance of Executive Order No. 11491 in 1969.20
Executive Order No. 11491 required that the collective bargain-
ing agreement include a negotiated grievance procedure as the
exclusive procedure for employees covered by the agreement, but
did not require the parties to provide for arbitration as part of
that procedure. However, if the parties agreed to arbitrate em-
ployee grievances, conventional non-advisory arbitration was re-
quired. If the parties were unable to determine whether a
statutory appeal procedure or the negotiated grievance procedure
covered the employee's grievance, they were required to refer the
matter to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management
Relations.21 Arbitrators had the authority to conclusively resolve
disputes over the interpretation or application of collective bar-
16. 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
17. Porter, Arbitration in the Federal Government: What Happened to the
"Magna Carta?", Ploc. 30TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L AcAD. AB. 93 (1978).
18. Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1959-1963 Compilation), re.
printed in 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964). Notwithstanding the constraints imposed by Ex-
ecutive Order 10,988, 266 out of 380 agreements sampled in one study contained
provisions for advisory arbitration. 81 Gov'T EMp. REL REP. 7522 (1970) (reference
file).
19. Aggrieved employees could take their grievances through the grievance
procedure established by the agency-employer, or through the grievance proce-
dure negotiated by the agency-employer and the union. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3
C.F.R. § 521 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
20. 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
21. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 22, 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1966-1970 Compilation), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
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gaining agreements, and the parties could file exceptions to the
arbitration award with the Federal Labor Relations Council.22
The Council had discretionary power to grant review of arbitra-
tion awards and decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Labor-Management Relations on grounds similar to those applied
by federal courts in private sector labor-management relations.23
Executive Order No. 11491 was amended by Executive Order
No. 11616 in 1971.24 Executive Order No. 11616 restricted the nego-
tiated grievance procedure solely to the interpretation or appli-
cation of the negotiated collective bargaining agreement and
excluded from the scope of the negotiated grievance procedure
those matters for which statutory appeal procedures existed. In
1975, Executive Order No. 11491 was again amended. Executive
Order No. 1183825 permitted an expansion in the scope and cover-
age of the parties' negotiated grievance procedures. It allowed
the parties to negotiate the coverage and scope of their grievance
procedure, provided the procedure negotiated did not conflict
with a federal statute or the Order itself. The only matters specif-
ically excluded from the scope of the negotiated grievance proce-
dure were those that were subject to a statutory appeal
procedure.
A number of defects in the system developed under amended
Executive Order No. 11491 were observed by commentators, fed-
eral sector labor organizations, and federal employees. These in-
cluded: the absence of an independent, impartial decision-making
body;26 the awkward provision requiring submission of un-
resolved grievability and arbitrability issues and claims that the
subject matter of a grievance was covered by a statutory appeal
procedure to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Manage-
22. Id. § 14, adopting the recommendations of the Interagency Study of the
Committee on Federal Labor Relations, Labor-Management Relations in the Fed-
eral Service 42 (1969) reprinted in FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS CouNciL, LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE (1975).
23. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 14, 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1966-1970 Compilation), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
24. Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. § 605 (1971-1975 Compilation). An example
of a matter for which a statutory appeal procedure exists is where an employee
alleges that he has been discriminated against in violation of equal employment
opportunity standards. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V
1975).
25. Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1971-1975 Compilation).
26. Porter, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Government: What Happened to
the "Magna Carta?", PRoc. 30TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 101 (1978).
ment Relations; 2 7 the opportunity for appeal of an arbitration
award to the Council;2 8 the dichotomy between matters subject to
negotiated grievance procedures and matters for which statutory
appeal procedures existed;29 the Council's failure to permit em-
ployees to invoke arbitration or appeal an adverse arbitration
award in cases where the union breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation to the exclusively represented employees by failing to
properly process an employee's grievance; 30 the various points of
delay inherent in the Executive Order arbitration scheme;31 and
the unwarranted intervention of the Comptroller General when
the legality of a back pay award was challenged by the agency-
employer.3 2 In addition, the arbitrator's authority to fashion rem-
edies and the arbitration of federal sector labor relations disputes
as a whole were procedurally undermined and circumscribed by
the appeal decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Council,
grievability and arbitrability determinations by the Assistant Sec-
retary of Labor, interpretations of the Back Pay Act by the Comp-
troller General, and the impact of the Civil Service Commission's
regulations and interpretations. 33
The whole process bore little resemblance to the private sector
system and demanded the impossible of even experienced federal
sector arbitrators. Less "back-seat driving" 34 was needed so that
the intent of the parties, as discerned by experienced arbitrators,
27. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, § 22, supra note 2.
28. Porter, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Government: What Happened to
the "Magna Carta?", PRoc. 30TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. Ann. 102 (1978).
29. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, § 13(a), supra note 2. "It is repeatedly
concluded that the present multiplicity of unrelated grievance and appeals chan-
nels are too complex, too untidy and overlapping, and too slow in providing resolu-
tion of problems." Valdes, The Expanding Role of the Arbitrator in the Federal
Service, PUB. PEAS. ADMIN. 3303 (1978).
30. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, § 13(b), supra note 2, provides that ar-
bitration may be invoked only by the agency-employer or the exclusive represen-
tative. Hence, an employee may not take his grievance to arbitration without the
union's or his employer's intervention. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
31. Kagel, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Service: How Final and Bind-
ing?, 51 ORE. L. REV. 143 (1971).
32. Id. at 148.
33. See generally U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT RELAnONS, GRIEVANCE ARBrrRA oN IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE (July 1977).
34. Gamser, Back-Seat Driving Behind the Back-Seat Driver: Arbitration in
the Federal Sector, PRoc. 31ST ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARn. 273 (1979). "Less
'back-seat driving'" is analogous to what those in the private sector refer to as def-
erence to arbitration, which is, after all, the forum the parties bargained for and
agreed to be bound by. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1972); see Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. American Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). But cf.
General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977); Roy Robinson, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
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could be applied to the administration and interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement.3 5
THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 mandates a number of
things that would normally be achieved only through collective
bargaining in the private sector. The Act requires that all collec-
tive bargaining agreements in the federal sector must provide for
binding arbitration as part of the negotiated grievance proce-
dure.36 The negotiated grievance procedure must be fair and sim-
ple and provide for expeditious processing and the settlement of
questions of arbitrability.37 The Executive Order practice of per-
mitting employees to present their grievances and have them ad-
justed by the agency-employer without the direct intervention of
the exclusive representative, so long as the representative is
given the opportunity to be present at the adjustment, is contin-
ued.38
The Act divests federal sector unions and employees of the
right to engage in strikes, work stoppages, slowdowns or picketing
of an agency-employer.3 9 In the private sector, the agreement not
to strike is the principal concession made by the union in ex-
change for the employer's agreement to arbitrate employee griev-
ances. However, since the Act eliminates the strike threat in the
federal sector and requires the agency-employer to provide for
grievance arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining
agreement, there is no overriding incentive for the agency-em-
ployer ever to reach an agreement with the exclusive bargaining
representative. By not reaching an agreement and yet fulfilling
the statutory duty to negotiate in good faith,40 the agency-em-
ployer forces the union and the employees to process disputes
pursuant to statutory appeal procedures. However, statutory ap-
35. Gamser, Back-Seat Driving Behind the Back-Seat Driver: Arbitration in
the Federal Sector, PRoc. 31sT ANN. MTG. NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 273, 281 (1979); Kagel,
Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Service: How Final and Binding?, 51 ORE. L.
REV. 134 (1971).
36. 5 U.S.C.A § 7121(b) (3) (C) (West Supp. 1979). There is no comparable pro-
vision governing private sector labor relations.
37. Id. § 7121(b) (1), (2). Under Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, § 22,
supra note 2, questions of arbitrability were normally referred to the Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations for resolution.
38. Id. § 7121(b) (3) (B). Cf. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, § 13(b), supra
note 2.
39. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(a) (7), (b) (7) (West Supp. 1979).
40. Id. § 7116(a) (5), (b) (5).
peal procedures are restricted to matters involving adverse
agency actions41 and employment discrimination complaints,42
and do not cover basic employee grievances. Consequently, a va-
riety of employee grievances can be effectively side-stepped by
the agency-employer in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement or an internal agency appeal procedure.
Nevertheless, there are several factors that make it advisable
for the federal agency-employer to enter into collective bargaining
agreements with federal unions, notwithstanding the resulting
compulsion to provide for negotiated grievance arbitration proce-
dures. Once a labor organization has been duly certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative, unrest in the work force and
a resultant decline in productivity is likely to occur until a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is entered into because of the uncer-
tainty of the collective bargaining process. Protracted collective
bargaining intensifies unrest in the work force, further diminish-
ing the productivity of the agency, and exposes the agency-em-
ployer and the exclusive representative to organizational raiding
of the work force by rival labor organizations. While organiza-
tional raiding of the work force is primarily the concern of the ex-
clusive representative, continued organizational campaigns create
an environment of uncertainty and unrest. Such an environment
is antithetical to the productivity and efficiency of the agency. I
It is also in the best interest of federal sector labor organiza-
tions to enter into collective bargaining agreements with agency-
employers. The agreement, if nothing else, assures the union of
the right to have federal sector labor relations disputes submitted
to arbitration rather than processed through the complicated and
time-consuming statutory appeal procedures. In addition, the ne-
gotiated grievance arbitration procedure provides a necessary fo-
rum for resolution of basic employee grievances.
The Scope of the Negotiated Grievance Arbitration Procedure
Although under the Executive Order the parties ostensibly
could determine the scope and coverage of the negotiated griev-
ance procedure, many matters were excluded from the scope of
negotiated grievance procedures by the Order itself or by other
laws and regulations. Subjects of negotiation which were specifi-
cally excluded were those areas of agency discretion which in-
volved the mission of the agency, its budget, its organization, the
assignment of personnel, the technology of performing its work,
41. Id. § 7121(e).
42. Id. § 7121(d).
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and internal security practices. 4 3 Also excluded from the scope
and coverage of negotiated grievance procedures were those mat-
ters for which statutory appeal procedures existed.44 As a conse-
quence, some of the most serious employee grievances, involving
such matters as removals, suspensions, reductions in grade or
pay, and reductions in work force, were exempted. Instead, dis-
putes over these matters went the time-consuming route of the
statutory appeal procedure applicable.
The Act expands the scope of matters subject to the negotiated
grievance arbitration procedure, including for the first time such
adverse actions as demotions, discharges, and long-term suspen-
sions. 45 The negotiated grievance arbitration procedure automati-
cally extends to all matters covered by the Act's broad definition
of "grievance" 46 unless the parties specifically agree to exclude
certain matters from the coverage of the grievance procedure47 or
the Act itself specifically excludes the matter from the scope of
the grievance procedure.4 8 Therefore, the onus is on the parties
to negotiate matters out from under the coverage of the grievance
arbitration procedure, rather than negotiating them into coverage,
as is the practice in the private sector.
Among those matters included are: removals or demotions for
performance reasons; adverse agency actions such as removals,
reductions in grade or pay, and suspensions or furloughs for 30
days or less; grievances concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act;
grievances over the withholding of within-grade increases; reduc-
tions in work force; and adverse suitability ratings.49 The only
matters specifically excluded by the Act itself are those concern-
ing prohibited political activities, retirement, life insurance,
health insurance, suspensions or removals for national security
reasons, examinations, certifications or appointments, and the
classification of any position which does not result in a reduction
43. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, §§ 11(b), 12(b), .supra note 2.
44. Id. § 13(a).
45. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7121(d), (e), (f) (West Supp. 1979). Under Executive Order
11,491, a negotiated grievance arbitration procedure could not cover matters for
which a statutory appeal procedure existed, and an arbitrator was precluded from
deciding questions that fell within a statutory appeal procedure.
46. Id. § 7103(a)(9).
47. Id. § 7121(a) (2).
48. Id. § 7121(c).
49. Frazier, Labor.Management Relations in the Federal Government, 30 LAB.
L.J. 131, 137 (1978).
865,
in grade or pay of an employee.5 0 Thus, within the broad defini-
tion of "grievance," grievance arbitration procedures can poten-
tially extend to a wide variety of labor relations disputes which
were, heretofore, within the exclusive province of a statutory ap-
peal procedure.
In most cases, if the parties agree to exclude from the scope of
the negotiated grievance procedure a matter already covered by a
statutory appeal procedure, that statutory appeal procedure is
available to all employees. If matters covered by an existing stat-
utory appeal procedure have not been specifically excluded by
the parties from the scope of the negotiated grievance procedure,
the negotiated grievance procedure is the sole avenue of appeal
available to bargaining unit employees.5 1 Cases involving matters
such as demotions for unacceptable performance5 2 or adverse ac-
tions53 are the exception to these principles. In these cases, the
employee may raise the matter under the negotiated grievance
procedure, if the procedure covers the matter, or may appeal the
matter to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).54 How-
ever, if the employee chooses to raise the matter under the nego-
tiated grievance procedure and the case results in arbitration, the
arbitration award cannot b5e appealed to the Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority (FLRA), as can other arbitral awards.5 5 The mat-
ter is instead appealable directly to federal court on the same
basis as a MSPB decision.5 6
If the employee alleges employment discrimination as the basis
for a grievance and elects to utilize the negotiated grievance pro-
cedure, the employee retains the right to request review by either
the MSPB or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) of the "final decision" in the case.5 7 This raises the dis-
tinct possibility that the employee can secure review by the
MSPB or the EEOC not only of orders of the FLRA, but also of
final dispositions of the grievance during the course of the negoti-
ated grievance arbitration procedure.8
50. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7121(c) (West Supp. 1979).
51. Id. § 7121(a)(1).
52. Id. § 4303.
53. Id. § 7512.
54. Id. § 7121(e)(1).
55. Id. § 7122(a).
56. Id. § 7121(f).
57. Id. § 7121(d).
58. An example of a situation in which a "final decision" may occur is where
either the union or the employer decides not to invoke binding arbitration. In ad-
dition, the employee may be able to obtain EEOC or MSPB review of the arbitra-
tion award since the final and binding arbitration award constitutes a "final
decision."
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If the grievance concerns a matter which is arguably an unfair
labor practice, the employee may raise the matter under the nego-
tiated grievance procedure, if the procedure covers the matter, or
may file an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA59 The em-
ployee does not have the option of filing unfair labor practice
charges with the FLRA for adverse actions taken by the agency-
employer or for removals or demotions for performance reasons.60
The employee has already been given the opportunity to resolve
these matters under the negotiated grievance procedure or the
applicable statutory appeal procedure.61 Consequently, "issues
which can properly be raised under an appeals procedure may
not be raised as an unfair labor practice."62
Resolution of Arbitrability and Grievability Issues
"Arbitrability" involves the question of whether a grievance is
subject to arbitration under the terms of the particular agree-
ment.63 A determination that a case is not arbitrable precludes an
arbitrator's decision on the merits of a grievance. "Grievability"
involves the interrelated question of whether the matter is sub-
ject to the particular grievance procedure negotiated by the par-
ties. Grievability may also involve the additional determination of
whether the matter is subject to a negotiated grievance procedure
or a statutory appeal procedure. A determination that the matter
is not grievable will prevent an employee or a labor organization
from processing the dispute under the negotiated grievance pro-
cedure. A dispute may be grievable and yet not arbitrable, possi-
bly because of an express exclusion of the matter from arbitration
by the terms of the negotiated grievance arbitration procedure.
The matter must first be found grievable and run the course of
the negotiated grievance procedure before the question of arbi-
trability is ever introduced as an issue. Hence, grievability is a
condition precedent to the arbitrability determination.
The Act substantially modifies the procedure for resolving
questions of arbitrability and grievability. Prior to enactment of
the Act the parties were required to refer questions of arbi-
trability and grievability to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for
59. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(d) (West Supp. 1979).
60. Id. §§ 4301, 7501.
61. Id. § 7121(e) (1).
62. Id. § 7116(d).
63. D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 62-63 (1979).
Labor-Management Relations,64 unless the parties had agreed to
refer these issues to the arbitrator instead.65 If the parties were
unable to agree whether or not a dispute was subject to a statu-
tory appeal procedure, however, they were required to refer this
issue to the Assistant Secretary for decision.66 The parties could
not, either by mutual consent or the abnegation of the Assistant
Secretary, submit this issue to the arbitrator for resolution.67 The
Act provides that federal sector arbitrators, like their private sec-
tor counterparts,68 will resolve questions of arbitrability. This is
the probable result of the Act's requirement that the negotiated
grievance procedure provide for resolution of questions of arbi-
trability.6 9
As a consequence of the Act's broad definition of grievance70
and the almost all-inclusive grievance procedure,71 the resolution
of questions of arbitrability by federal sector arbitrators is likely
to develop along lines similar, if not identical, to the current pri-
vate sector practice. Thus, "all doubts are to be resolved in favor
of coverage or inclusion absent an express exclusion or the most
forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude a claim from arbitra-
tion."72
Arbitral Considerations of External Law and Principles of
Interpretation
The role of the arbitrator in the federal sector differs substan-
tially from that of the private sector arbitrator. The Act provides
that if upon review of an arbitration award the FLRA finds the
award deficient because it is contrary to any law, rule or regula-
tion, the FLRA is empowered to modify the award to the extent it
deems necessary and that is consistent with applicable laws,
64. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, §§ 6(a) (5), 13(d), supra note 2, adopt-
ing the Report and Recommendations of the Federal Labor Relations Council on
the Amendment of Executive Order No. 11,491, as amended (1975), reprinted in
FMDERAL LABOR RELATIONS CouNcIL, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN TnE FED-
ERAL SERVICE 57 (1975).
65. See Exec. Order No. 11,616, § 8, 3 C.F.R. § 605 (1971-1975 Compilation),
amending Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 13(d), 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1966-1970 Compilation),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
66. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, § 22, supra note 2.
67. Frazier, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Service, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
712, 753 (1977).
68. See generally Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593(1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 364 (1960). These three cases are popularly
referred to as "the Steelworkers Trilogy."
69. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7121 (a) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
70. Id. § 7103(a)(9).
71. Id. § 7121(a)(2), (c).
72. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960).
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rules or regulations.7 3 Hence, an arbitrator's consideration of ex-
ternal law74 is compulsory and always within the proper scope of
the arbitrator's authority in the federal sector. This contrasts
with the private sector practice where an arbitrator who bases his
award on an extrinsic statutory policy exceeds his arbitral author-
ity and exposes his award to appellate attack.75 The reason for
this difference is the existence of a multitude of federal laws,
rules and regulations which governs nearly every aspect of the
federal sector employment relationship and establishes the basic
conditions of federal employment by statute.7 6 Thus, there are
fewer opportunities to negotiate over policy issues than would be
the normal fare for collective bargaining in the private sector.77
Since the federal sector arbitrator must examine both the lan-
guage of the collective bargaining agreement and any applicable
external law, problems of interpretation and the authoritative ef-
fect of the arbitrator's interpretation of applicable external law
arise. If the provisions of the contract and external law overlap
but are not necessarily in conflict, "most arbitrators would agree
that... an arbitrator could probably look to the [external law] as
an interpetative aid of the contract, and hence may rule on ques-
tions of [external law] that arise in connection with a contractual
grievance."7 8 However, it is unclear what approach the arbitrator
should adopt if the provisions of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and those of the external law appear to be in conflict. It is
an essential principle of arbitral interpretation that "an interpre-
tation that would bring the contract into conflict with positive law
is to be avoided."7 9 This principle rests on the presumption that
the parties intended their provisions to conform to law. Given
this sound premise, the arbitrator may reasonably assume that
the parties intended the lawful interpretation.
73. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7122(a) (West Supp. 1979).
74. "External law" refers to laws, rules and regulations not specifically incor-
porated in the collective bargaining agreement.
75. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Steelworkers v. En-
terprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
76. The conditions of employment which have been established pursuant to
Title V of U.S.C., 80 Stat. 378 (1970), constitute a comprehensive package of bene-
fits preempting collective bargaining over such matters as wages, hours of work,
insurance, leave, retention, and a variety of other basic conditions of employment.
77. Weber, Federal Labor Relations: Problems and Prospectus, PRoc. 24TH
ANN. MTG. NAT'L AcAD. ARn. 148 (1971).
78. D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBrr TION LAW AND PRACTICE 72 (1979).
79. Id. at 166.
The question of what authoritative weight should be accorded
the arbitrator's interpretation of external law by a reviewing court
or agency remains to be resolved. In Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver 8O the Supreme Court of the United States was afforded the
opportunity to consider the problem. The Court refused to adopt
any standards to guide appellate review of an arbitral interpreta-
tion of external law, concluding that such a determination was
within the province of the reviewing court in considering the facts
and circumstances of each case.81 Nevertheless, in dicta, the
Supreme Court set forth a number of relevant factors which re-
viewing courts should consider in evaluating an arbitration award
interpreting external law. These factors are:
(1) The existence of provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement which conform substantially to external law;
(2) The degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum;
(3) The adequacy of the record with respect to the issue
which overlaps external law; and
(4) The special competence of particular arbitrators.82
If these factors are met and the arbitral determination gives full
consideration to an employee's external law rights, a reviewing
court may properly accord the arbitrator's interpretation great
weight.83
Whether the arbitrator's interpretation of external law is only
advisory and subject to de novo review or should be binding as
between the parties is debatable.84 The Act requires federal sec-
tor arbitrators to consider and interpret external law in the course
of resolving federal sector labor relations disputes and to make
their awards consistent with such applicable external law.85 This
demands a greater degree of arbitral expertise and the utilization
of resources alien to the private sector experience and condition-
ing of most arbitrators. An increased reliance on the parties for
the sources of applicable external law will result. As long as the
arbitrator observes the factors indicated by the Supreme Court in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and considers and implements ap-
plicable external law in reaching his decision, his interpretation
of external law should be binding as between the parties.
80. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
81. Id. at 60 n.21.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. "Some arbitrators argue that an arbitrator's ruling is only advisory, subject
to de novo review if the parties seek enforcement or vacation of the award.. .
because such legal issues are outside the arbitrator's authority and expertise.
Others have argued that his interpretation should be binding between the par-
ties." D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBrrPATION LAw AND PRACnc- 73 (1979).
85. 5 U.S.C.A § 7122(a) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
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Grounds for Exception to the Arbitration Award
The Act authorizes the FLRA to resolve exceptions to arbitra-
tion awards.86 The FLRA has announced that it plans to abandon
the two-step procedure used by the Council in reviewing arbitra-
tion awards 87 in favor of a single-step procedure designed to expe-
dite the resolution of arbitrability appeals.88 Therefore, upon
receipt of a petition averring one or more grounds for reviewing
an arbitration award, the FLRA will proceed directly to address
the merits of the exceptions to the arbitration award. The FLRA
Interim Regulations 89 require not only that one or more grounds
for review must be presented, but also that the petition contain
evidence or rulings bearing on the issues before the FLRA, con-
tain arguments and authorities in support of the stated grounds,
and be accompanied by a legible copy of the award.9 0
To ensure that arbitration awards are consistent with applica-
ble laws, rules and regulations, the Act permits the FLRA to grant
review of an arbitration award if it is alleged that the award is de-
ficient because it is contrary to any law, rule or regulation.9 1
These grounds are known as the "federal sector grounds"92 be-
cause they recognize the extensive body of federal statutes and
regulations affecting the federal sector employment relationship.
86. Id. §§ 7105 (a) (2) (H), 7122(a). Accord, Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended,
§ 14, supra note 2.
87. The Council's two-step procedure of arbitral review involved an initial de-
termination of whether or not to accept the petition for review based upon the suf-
ficiency of the facts and circumstances presented in the petition. This
determination was followed by an independent determination by the Council of
the merits of the grounds alleged, based upon the sufficiency of the arguments of
the parties at a hearing before the Council, and perhaps the interpretation of an
appropriate regulation by the issuing administrative authority, when requested. 5
C.F.R. §§ 2411.32, .36, .37 (1978); Frazier, supra note 67, at 718-19. However, note
that acceptance of the petition for review did not necessarily mean that the Coun-
cil would modify, set aside, or remand the arbitration award. See, e.g., U.S. Marine
Corps Supply Center, Rep. No. 122, F.LR.C. No. 75A-98 (March 8, 1977); F.L.R.C.
INFORMATION ANNoUNCEMENT (July 2, 1976).
88. Address by Ronald W. Haughton, Chairman of the FLRA, Washington,
D.C. (March 29-30, 1979), reprinted in pertinent part in GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 806:6
(April 16, 1979).
89. 5 C.F.R. § 2400 (1979), reprinted in GOV'T EmP. REL REP. 822: Special Sup-
plement (August 6, 1979).
90. 5 C.F.R. § 2425.2 (1979).
91. 5 U.S.C.A § 7122(a) (1) (West Supp. 1979); accord, F.LR.A. INTrmuM RULES
AND REGULATIONS, 5 C.F.R. § 2425.4(a) (1) (1979).
92. Gamser, Back-Seat Driving Behind the Back-Seat Driver: Arbitration in
the Federal Sector, PROc. 31sT ANN. MTG. NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 273 (1979).
As an additional basis for securing review of an arbitration award,
the Act specifies "other grounds similar to those applied by fed-
eral courts in private sector labor-management relations."93
The Federal Sector Grounds
The Executive Order provided that only those challenges based
on government-wide regulations promulgated by the Civil Serv-
ice Commission or by some other central regulatory agency could
be the basis for a challenge to an arbitration award.94 The Act
does not expressly indicate what is meant by a "regulation" for
purposes of filing an exception to an arbitration award. However,
Congress adopted language identical to that of the Executive Or-
der, thus indicating an intent not to change the meaning of the
term "regulation" for purposes of stating a ground for exception
to an arbitration award.
Upon acceptance of a petition for review of an arbitration award
based upon the claim that the award violated an appropriate law,
rule or regulation, the Council often requested an interpretation
of the law, rule or regulation involved from the issuing agency
and the basis for that interpretation.95 The FLRA is similarly em-
powered to request an advisory interpretation from the issuing
agency, such as the Office of Personnel Management, concerning
the proper interpretation of rules, regulations or policy directives
that affect or are affected by the arbitration award.96 If, according
to the interpretation of the issuing agency, the award is violative
of an appropriate law, rule or regulation, the FLRA may modify or
set aside the award accordingly. 97
An agency-employer's internal regulations were not considered
93. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7122(a) (2) (West Supp. 1979); accord, F.L.R.A. INTErm RULES
& REGULATIONS, 5 C.F.R. § 2425A(a) (2) (1979).
94. Indiana Army Ammunition Plant & N.F.F.E., Rep. No. 92, F.LR.C. No. 75A-
84 (November 28, 1975); Valdes, The Expanding Role of the Arbitrator in the Fed-
eral Service, PUB. PIRs. ADMIn. 3306 (1978). The Council held that the Civil Serv-
ice Commission regulations found in the Federal Personnel Manual were
appropriate regulations within the meaning of the Council's rules. See, e.g., Fran-
cis E. Warren Air Force Base & A.F.G.E. Local 2354, Rep. No. 114, F.L.R.C. No. 75A-
127 (September 30, 1976). The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 appears to have
absorbed this ground, requiring appropriate rules and regulations to be govern-
ment-wide in order to be precluded from the scope of negotiations. See 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 7117(a) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
95. U.S. CIVIL SERVICE CoMMIssION, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS, GRIEVANCE ARBrrRATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 3 (July 1977).
96. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7122(a) (West Supp. 1979); accord, F.L.R.A. INTEium RULES &
REGULATIONS, 5 C.F.R. § 2425.4(a) (1) (1979).
97. Francis E. Warren Air Force Base & A.F.G.E. Local 2354, Rep. No. 114,
F.L.R.C. No. 75A-127 (September 30, 1976); Gamser, Back-Seat Driving Behind The
Back-Seat Driver: Arbitration in the Federal Sector, PRoc. 31sT ANN. MTG. NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. 273, 275 (1979).
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"appropriate regulations" for purposes of establishing a ground
for review of an arbitration award.98 Disputes based on these reg-
ulations were, therefore, subject to final and binding arbitration
whether or not the regulations were incorporated in the collective
bargaining agreement,99 as long as they were not excluded from
the arbitrator's authority by an express provision in the collective
bargaining agreement. 0 0 These principles remain valid in the
federal sector because the Act adopts the identical language of
the Executive Order.
The arbitrator's failure to decide whether an agency-employer
committed an unfair labor practice in violation of section 19 of the
Executive Order'O' was not considered a ground upon which a
petition for review of an arbitration award would be granted. The
Act retains this identical provision, which recognizes that the pro-
cedures for resolving unfair labor practice charges and the negoti-
ated grievance arbitration procedures are mutually exclusive. 0 2
If the conduct complained of constituted a violation of both the
Executive Order and the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, section 19 of the Order provided that the matter could be
raised under either the negotiated grievance procedure or the un-
fair labor practice procedure of the Order. Once raised under one
procedure, however, the matter could not thereafter be brought
under the other procedure.103 The Act continues this practice, re-
quiring the party to make an irrevocable election of forum. 04 Re-
quiring the employee to elect the procedure within which to bring
his dispute differs from the private sector approach of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB defers exercis-
ing its unfair labor practice jurisdiction if the matter can be
98. See F.A.A. & P.A.T.C.O., Rep. No. 88, F.LR.C. No. 74A-88 (July 24, 1975);
F.L.R.C. INFORMATION ANNOUNCEMENT 7-8 (July 2, 1976); Gamser, Back-Seat Driv-
ing Behind the Back-Seat Driver: Arbitration in the Federal Sector, PRoc. 31ST
ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 273, 276 (1979).
99. U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS, GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 5 (July 1977). The Civil
Service Commission observes that a "careful review of Council decisions on ap-
peals of arbitration awards reveals that the Council has never set aside or modi-
fied an arbitration award solely on the grounds that an arbitrator misinterpreted
an agency regulation which was properly before him." Id.
100. F.A.A. & P.A.T.C.O., Rep. No. 88, F.L.R.C. No. 74A-88 (July 24, 1975).
101. See F.LR.C. INFORMATION ANNOUNCEMENT 9 (July 2, 1976).
102. 5 U.S.CA § 7116(d) (West Supp. 1979).
103. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amended, § 19(d), supra note 2.
104. 5 U.S.CA § 7116(d) (West Supp. 1979).
resolved under the parties' negotiated grievance arbitration pro-
cedure. However, the NLRB retains limited jurisdiction to ensure
that the arbitrator promptly resolves the dispute and yields a re-
sult that is not repugnant to the National Labor Relations Act.105
The Private Sector Grounds
The Act,106 like the Executive Order, speaks of grounds "similar
to those applied by federal courts in the private sector,"10 7 not of
grounds identical to those applied by federal courts in the private
sector. Because of this terminology, the Council was free to rec-
ognize those private sector grounds which it found appealing.
Moreover, the Council had discretionary authority to modify any
of the private sector grounds it chose to implement. However, the
Council integrated the entire spectrum of grounds applied by fed-
eral courts in the private sector into the federal service labor-
management relations system with one notable exception108 A
similar approach by the FLRA should ensue because of the nearly
identical language found in the Act, mandating the FLRA to rec-
ognize grounds similar to those applied by federal courts in pri-
vate sector labor-management relations.
At least six grounds were recognized by the Council under the
rubric of private sector grounds: (1) The arbitrator exceeded his
authority by deciding an issue not included in the question(s)
submitted to arbitration or by exceeding an explicit limitation on
his authority to render an award;10 9 (2) the award does not draw
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement;1' 0 (3) the
award is incomplete, ambiguous or contradictory so as to make
implementation of the award impossible; (4) the award is based
on a non-fact, i.e., 'the central fact underlying the award is con-
cededly erroneous and in fact a gross mistake of fact but for
105. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). But cf. General Am.
Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977); Roy Robinson, Inc., 228 N.L.RB. 828 (1977).
106. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7122(a) (2) (West Supp. 1979).
107. Frazier, supra note 67, at 719.
108. See U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS, GRIEVANCE ARBrrRATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 9-12 (July 1977). Breach
of the union's duty of fair representation was the exception to the general practice
of the Council. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see also Hines v. Anchor Mo-
tor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1974).
109. F.LR.C. INFORmATION ANNOUNCEMENT 9-10 (July 2, 1976). Accord, Electri-
cal Workers Local 278 v. Jetero Corp., 496 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971); Magnavox Corp.
v. IUE, 410 F.2d 388 (6th Cir. 1969).
110. FJ.R.C. INFORmATION ANNOUNCEMENT 9-11 (July 2, 1976). Accord, Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), a private sector case
which sketched the limits of judicial deference to arbitration awards by announc-
ing that in order to be enforceable an arbitration award must draw its essence
.from the collective bargaining agreement.
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which a different result would have been reached";"' (5) the arbi-
trator was biased or partial; and (6) the arbitrator refused to hear
pertinent and material evidence."12 In addition, the Council
adopted the private sector principle prohibiting enforcement of an
award requiring a party to perform an illegal act."13
Unfortunately, if the exclusive representative breached its duty
of fair representation by wrongfully failing to process or refusing
to process, or negligently processing an employee grievance,"14
the aggrieved federal employee was not permitted to invoke the
arbitration machinery without the assistance of the exclusive rep-
resentative, or to contest the arbitration award in federal court.
This was contrary to the private sector practice which not only
permits such recourse by the aggrieved employee,1 5 but also sub-
jects the union to a damage award under the provisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act." 6 The FLRA possesses the statutory
authority to transcend the Council's reluctance to integrate
breach of duty of fair representation into the federal sector as a
basis for finding an arbitration award deficient on private sector
grounds."7 The FLRA should adopt the sound approach taken in
the private sector and recognize breach of duty of fair representa-
111. F.L.R.C. IIFOIMATION ANNOUNCEMENT 12 (July 2, 1976).
112. Id. at 9-12.
113. See Office of Economic Opportunity, Rep. No. 95, F.L.R.C. No. 75A-23 (De-
cember 31, 1975), in which the arbitrator directed the agency-employer to pay pu-
nitive damages, which were not available as a remedy under Executive Order
11,491. Accord, Glendale Mfg. Co. v. ILGWU Local 520, 283 F.2d 936, 940 (4th Cir.
1960).
114. There exists a conflict among the circuits as to whether a duty of fair rep-
resentation case can be predicated on the negligence of the union in processing an
employee's grievance. See Milstead v. Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.
1978) (inept handling of a grievance held to warrant breach of duty of fair repre-
sentation); Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1978) (under some
circumstances negligence might breach the duty); Robesky v. Quantas Empire
Airways, 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978). (rejecting negligence as a basis for breach of
the duty unless so egregious and arbitrary as to amount to a reckless disregard for
the rights of the individual); Coe v. Rubber Workers, 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting negligence as a basis for breach of the duty). The NLRB has consist-
ently held that negligent action or inaction of a union by itself is insufficient to
constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. See Truck Drivers Local 692,
202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1974); NLRB General Counsel Memorandum 79-55 (1979) (ex-
plaining his position regarding issuance of complaints in fair representation cases
predicated on negligence).
115. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967).
116. National Labor Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
117. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7122(a) (2) (West Supp. 1979).
tion as an additional private sector ground for filing an exception
to an arbitration award and permit aggrieved federal employees
to invoke the negotiated grievance arbitration procedure in such
cases.
In the private sector, a party may challenge an arbitration
award based upon any of the aforementioned grounds, but may
not, as a practical matter, challenge the reasoning of the arbitra-
tor's opinion. It is the arbitrator's interpretation that the parties
have bargained for and by which they have agreed to be bound18
The Council adopted this principle of deference to arbitration
awards and resolved to uphold awards unless they were "so pal-
pably faulty that no judge or group of judges could ever conceiva-
bly have made such a ruling," and the award could not "in any
rational way be derived from the agreement."" 9 Consequently,
an arbitrator's alleged misinterpretation of an agreement was
rarely grounds for Council review of an arbitration award.120 The
limited review mandate of the FLRA is identical to that of the
Council. The FLRA determines whether the arbitrator considered
the proper sources in resolving the grievance, but does not deter-
mine whether the arbitrator resolved the grievance correctly. 12'
Consequently, as FLRA member Frazier recently declared, "just
as the Council adhered strictly to its mandate, so will the FLRA.
It will not relitigate a grievance on its merits."122
Post-Arbitration Review and Enforcement
Arbitration decisions are appealable to the FLRA on the same
bases as they were formerly appealable to the Council. While
fourteen percent of all federal sector awards are appealed, as
compared to one-half percent of all private sector awards,123 only
118. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)1 Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 364 (1960).
119. N.A.G.E. Local R8-14 & F.A.A., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Rep. No. 79,
F.L.R.C. No. 74A-38 (July 30, 1975); F.L.R.C. INFORMATION ANNOUNCEMENT 11 (July
2, 1976).
120. Frazier, supra note 67, at 744. See, e.g., Automated Logistics Management
Systems Agency, Rep. No. 115, F.L.R.C. No. 76A-69 (Nov. 5, 1976); Dep't Air Force,
Scott Air Force Base, Rep. No. 96, F.L.R.C. No. 75A-101 (January 30, 1976); accord,
Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery Workers, 412 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1969); Ludwig Ho-
nold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969); Safeway Stores v. Bakery
Workers Local 111, 390 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally GoRMAN, BASIC TExT
ON LABOR LAw 585 (1976).
121. Remarks of Henry B. Frazier, HII, Member, FLRA, Organization and Func-
tion of Federal Sector Dispute Resolution Machinery Under The Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1978, before the Federal Personnel Associations of New York and New
Jersey (May 19, 1979).
122. Id.
123. Address by Ronald W. Haughton, Chairman, FLRA, Federal Sector Labor
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one percent of all federal sector awards have been set aside in
their entirety and only two percent have required modification.124
The percentage of affirmance of appealed federal sector arbitra-
tion awards is impressive considering the multitude of federal
laws and regulations which impinge upon the arbitration process
in the federal sector, and the private sector conditioning of most
federal sector arbitrators.
The Act provides that decisions of the FLRA concerning arbitra-
tion awards are final and exempt from judicial review except as to
constitutional issues 125 or where the final order of the FLRA in-
volves an unfair labor practice.126 Permitting judicial review of
final orders of the FLRA involving unfair labor practices presents
a troublesome issue when enforcement of the arbitration award
becomes necessary. The Deputy Director of Labor Relations for
the Department of Defense has argued that the statutory excep-
tion to the general rule precluding judicial review of arbitration
awards refers to more than mere refusals to arbitrate or abide by
an arbitration award.127 He argues that refusing to arbitrate a
grievance or abide by an arbitration award constitutes a violation
of the parties' bargaining obligation. Since this would be an un-
fair labor practice in any event, it is consequently not sufficient
grounds for affording judicial review of an arbitration award.128
Although the FLRA's order in the unfair labor practice proceeding
would clearly constitute a judicially reviewable "order of the Au-
thority," 129 the FLRA will have to determine whether a petition
for judicial enforcement of an arbitration award can be consid-
Relations: An Overview After Four Months Under Title VII, at a meeting of the
Society of Federal Labor Relations Professionals, Pacific Southwest Chapter (May
1,1979).
124. Remarks by Henry B. Frazier, IM Member, FLRA, Arbitration in the Fed-
eral Sector, before the Department of the Navy, Office of the General Counsel
(March 19, 1979).
125. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7702 (West Supp. 1979); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (affording judicial review of grievances involving potential
cause of action for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1970)).
126. 5 U.S.C.A § 7123 (a) (1) (West Supp. 1979). There is no counterpart to the
Civil Service Reform Act's exception to the general rule prohibiting judicial review
of arbitration awards in the National Labor Relations Act, which is supposed to be
the model in this area.
127. Remarks of Stuart M. Foss, Deputy Director of Labor Relations, Depart-
ment of Defense, before the Federal Bar Association's Conference on Labor Rela-
tions in the Federal Service (1979).
128. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116 (a) (5), (b) (5) (West Supp. 1979).
129. Id.
ered prior to the filing of an unfair labor practice charge.130
Under the Executive Order, there were no sure means of forc-
ing a recalcitrant party to submit to arbitration or to enforce an
arbitration award.' 3l In fact, the Council held that the Executive
Order did not contemplate enforcement of arbitration awards as
part of its function of considering exceptions to arbitration
awards.132 This approach differs from that of the private sector.
In the private sector, the parties can go to a single court for either
an order to set aside an arbitration award, or for an order enforc-
ing the award, thus providing concurrent resolution of both is-
sues. 33 The federal courts, however, have held that enforcement
of federal employee rights flowing from the Executive Order was
a matter best left to the executive branch, and not to the judici-
ary.134 However, "the courts will intervene when denials of con-
stitutional rights are at issue.1 35 Also, since the Executive Order
has been superceded by the Act, increased judicial intervention
on behalf of aggrieved federal employees is now possible.
The correct procedure to secure compliance with a final and
binding arbitration award remains anything but clear. The FLRA
Interim Regulations 36 require that unfair labor practice charges
based on the failure of a party to comply with an arbitration
award be given priority over all other cases in the FLRA Regional
Office where such charges are filed.137 Requiring the employee or
the union to resort to the unfair labor practice forum to secure en-
forcement of a final and binding arbitration award constitutes a
waste of that forum's valuable time and permits the agency-em-
ployer to ignore the arbitration award which the Act decrees to be
final and binding on the agency-employer. Such conduct by the
agency-employer should be discouraged rather than invited.
Therefore, the FLRA should strive to provide prompt resolution of
130. See Govr EMP. REL REP. 805:6 (April 9, 1979) reporting on A.F.G.E. Local
1662 & United States Army Communications Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
131. Kagel, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Service: How Final and Bind-
ing?, 51 ORE. L. REV. 134 (1971).
132. Department Army, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Rep. No. 67, F.L.R.C. No.
74A-46 (March 20, 1975).
133. See National Labor Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Frazier,
supra note 67, at 755, criticized the federal sector practice of enforcing arbitration
awards under Exec. Order 11,491, urging it to be replaced by the private sector
practice in order to provide faster resolution of enforcement issues.
134. See, e.g., Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
135. Porter, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Government: What Happened to
the "Magna Carta?", Pnoc. 3(0ra ANN. MTG. NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 97 (1978).
136. 5 C.F.R. § 2400 (1979).
137. Id. § 2423.6(d).
[VOL. 17: 857, 1980] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
arbitration award appeals in order to expedite enforcement of
final and binding arbitration awards.
Arbitral Intervention by the Comptroller General
In order to correct a major deficiency of the Executive Order,
namely that arbitrators were unable to provide meaningful "make
whole remedies," Congress amended the Back Pay Act.138 Fed-
eral sector arbitrators may now award back pay and attorneys'
fees and provide other corrective action to remedy a grievance. 3 9
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 does not expressly make any
changes in the Back Pay Act's requirement that, before a back
pay award can be made, the arbitrator must make three prelimi-
nary findings. The arbitrator must find that:
(1) The employee has undergone an unjustified personnel
action in violation of an otherwise valid mandatory pro-
vision in a collective bargaining agreement;
(2) Such action resulted in a withdrawal of pay, allowances
or differentials, as defined by applicable Civil Service
Commission regulations; and
(3) "But for" the wrongful action, the withdrawal of pay, al-
lowances or differentials would not have occurred.140
This "but for" finding is crucial to the validity of the back pay
award because in the absence of such a finding the Comptroller
General will strike the back pay award.141
While federal courts usually refused to intervene in the admin-
istration of the Executive Order, the Comptroller General, as
guardian of the federal purse,142 was all too willing to do so if
monetary awards were included in the arbitration award. Under
existing federal law, individual disbursing officers who make pay-
ments that are not lawfully authorized may incur personal liabil-
138. 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) (1970). "Make whole remedies" refers to such remedies
as monetary awards or promotion orders, which are designed to "make whole" the
employee for the loss of benefits, wages, etc., proximately resulting from the
wrongful conduct of the employer.
139. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (West Supp. 1979), amending 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) (1) (A) (i),
(ii) (1970).
140. Gamser, Back-Seat Driving Behind the Back-Seat Driver: Arbitration in
the Federal Sector, Pioc. 31ST ANN. MTG. NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 273, 277 (1979).
141. UNIrrED STATES GOVERNMENT AcCOUNTING OFFICE, MARuAL ON REMEDIES
AVAILABLE TO THIRD-PARTIES IN ADJUDICATING FEDERAL EMPLOYEE GRIEVANcES
App. I (1977).
142. 5 U.S.C. § 41 (1970).
ity for the amounts improperly disbursed. 4 3 The prospect of
personal liability had a chilling effect on the payment of question-
able monies by disbursing officers pursuant to an arbitration
award. When in doubt about the authority to make a particular
payment in accordance with an arbitration award, the disbursing
officer could request an advance decision from the Comptroller
General as to the legality of the proposed disbursement.144 As
stated by one commentator: "Not surprisingly, this provision of
the law was seized upon by agencies as a means of challenging
and frequently reversing adverse arbitration awards involving
monetary awards."'1 45
The problem of intervention by the Comptroller General in the
federal sector arbitration process led the Council to advise the
parties to file exceptions to arbitration awards promptly with the
Council, so that the Council might secure the Comptroller Gen-
eral's advice as to whether the award could be complied with.146
Nevertheless, the Comptroller General's position under the Exec-
utive Order was that, whether or not the agency-employer filed an
exception to the arbitration award with the Council, the agency-
employer had the unqualified right to request a binding decision
of the Comptroller General regarding the lawful expenditure of
government funds. It is unclear whether the Act affects the
Comptroller General's power in this area. By providing a statu-
tory foundation for federal sector arbitration awards, the Act
should serve to discourage such unauthorized appeals to the
Comptroller General. Nevertheless, the Act is silent on this prob-
lem, requiring the FLRA to take a firm stance against the Comp-
troller General's intervention.147
Processing Federal Sector Labor Relations Disputes Under the
Act
The Act permits the exclusive representative or the agency-em-
ployer to invoke binding arbitration of federal sector labor rela-
tions disputes. 48 The federal employee may not invoke binding
arbitration of matters that were not satisfactorily settled under
the negotiated grievance arbitration procedure without the assist-
ance of the exclusive representative or the agency-employer. This
143. 31 U.S.C. §§ 82(a) (1), (2) (B), 506, 508, 510-511, 514, 516, (1970).
144. 5 U.S.C. § 74 (1970).
145. Porter, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Government: What Happened to
the "Magna Carta?", Pnoc. 30TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 98 (1978).
146. Dep't Army, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Rep. No. 67, F.LR.C. No. 74A-46
(March 20, 1975); Gov'T Emp. REL. REP. 638:A-14 (January 14, 1976).
147. 54 Comp. Gen. 921, 927 (1975).
148. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7121(b) (3) (C) (West Supp. 1979).
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is one of the major deficiencies of the Act. If the employee elects
to bring the matter under the negotiated grievance procedure, the
matter is not satisfactorily settled under that procedure, and
neither the exclusive representative nor the agency-employer
chooses to invoke binding arbitration, the employee's grievance is
left unresolved. 4 9
Under the Act, four different types of federal sector labor rela-
tions disputes are discernible, and each entails its own uniquely
complex processing machinery. The four types of disputes are
pure grievance cases, pure discrimination cases, mixed cases, and
removal, demotion and suspension cases.
Pure Grievance Cases
A "pure grievance" is a grievance which does not involve any of
the following circumstances: a reduction in grade or removal for
unacceptable performance; a removal, suspension for more than
14 days, reduction in grade or pay, or furlough of 30 days or less;
or a complaint of discrimination.150 Diagram 1 illustrates the gen-
eral procedure for processing pure grievance cases.151
First, the employee or exclusive representative must fie a
grievance with the agency-employer pursuant to the terms of the
negotiated grievance procedure,152 provided the matter has not
been specifically excluded from the scope of the negotiated griev-
ance procedure by the terms of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement or by the Act.153 If the matter has not been excluded,
the negotiated grievance procedure is the exclusive procedure
available to the bargaining unit employees for resolving pure
grievances.154 If the matter has been excluded, then it is not
properly grievable and must instead be submitted pursuant to an
applicable statutory appeal procedure.
If the matter has not been excluded from the scope of the nego-
tiated grievance procedure and is not satisfactorily settled there-
149. Cases involving claims of employment discrimination are exceptions to
this proposition since the employee in such cases is not required to make an irrev-
ocable election of forum. See 5 U.S.CA § 7121(d), (e) (West Supp. 1979).
150. C. Brian Harris, Chief, Arbitration Division, Federal Labor Relations Au-
thority (FLRA), Diagram on Processing Federal Sector Labor Relations Disputes
(1979) (hereinafter cited as Diagram).
151. Adapted from Diagram, supra note 150.
152. 5 U.S.CA. § 7121(b) (3) (A), (B) (West Supp. 1979).
153. Id. § 7121(a) (2), (c).
154. Id. § 7121(a)(1).
DIAGRAM 1-PURE GRIEVANCE CASES
under, either the exclusive representative or the agency-employer
may invoke binding arbitration.155 The parties then present their
respective positions regarding the grievance and their interpreta-
tions of the relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and advise the arbitrator of any applicable external law at
the arbitration hearing. Based on the evidence presented, the ar-
bitrator makes a decision and fashions an appropriate award. Ei-
ther party to the arbitration may then file exceptions to the
arbitration award with the FLRA.156 If no exceptions are ified
within thirty days from the date of the award, the award becomes
final and binding on the parties.157
If one of the parties fies an exception to the award with the
FLRA, the FLRA will consider the merits of the grounds al-
leged. 5 8 If the FLRA finds the award deficient because it is con-
trary to external law or on other grounds similar to those applied
by federal courts in private sector labor-management relations,
the FLRA may "take such action and make such recommenda-
tions concerning the award as it deems necessary, consistent with
applicable rules, law or regulations." 5 9 The final order of the
FLRA in pure grievance cases is precisely that-final.160 Judicial
review of the FLRA's final order is available only if it involves an
unfair labor practice charge.'61
155. Id. § 7121(b) (3) (C).
156. Id. § 7122(a).
157. Id. § 7122(b).
158. Id. § 7122(a).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 7122(b).
161. Id. § 7123(a).
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Pure Discrimination Cases
A "pure discrimination case" is one in which the sole allegation
is that the employee has been discriminated against by the
agency-employer.162 Diagram 2 illustrates the general procedure
for processing pure discrimination cases.163
A complaint of discrimination64 may be raised under either the
negotiated grievance procedure, if the procedure contains a non-
discrimination clause, or the statutory appeal procedure.165 The
employee makes an irrevocable election of forum by timely initi-
ating an action under the applicable statutory appeal procedure
or by filing a timely grievance in writing under the provisions of
the negotiated grievance procedure.166 If the employee elects to
ifie an employment discrimination complaint with the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board (MSPB), thereby invoking the statutory
appeal procedure machinery, the matter must be decided within
162. Diagram, supra note 150.
163. Adapted from Diagram, supra note 150.
164. "Discrimination" is defined by 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
165. 5 U.S.CA. § 7121(d) (West Supp. 1979).
166. Id.
DIAGRAM 2-PuRE DISCRIMNATION CASES
120 days of the MSPB's receipt thereof.167 If the MSPB fails to de-
cide the case within this period, the aggrieved employee may file
a civil action in federal district court 180 days after the complaint
was filed with the MSPB.168 If the MSPB makes its determination
within the requisite 120 day period, the employee may seek re-
view of the MSPB decision by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC)169 or in federal district court.o7 0 If the
employee elects to seek EEOC review, the EEOC must render a
decision within 180 days. If the EEOC does not render a decision
within 180 days, the employee may file a civil action in federal dis-
trict court.171 A decision by the EEOC within the statutory period
is judicially reviewable.7 2
On the other hand, the employee may elect to pursue the dis-
crimination complaint as a grievance under the negotiated griev-
ance procedure. If the matter is not resolved under the
negotiated grievance procedure, either the agency-employer or
the exclusive bargaining representative may invoke binding arbi-
tration.173 Prior to invocation of binding arbitration, the employee
may request the EEOC to review a "final decision" concerning
the grievance.174 This "final decision" can occur at any stage of
the negotiated grievance procedure prior to invocation of arbitra-
tion, and the EEOC decision is judicially reviewable.i7 5 If the
EEOC fails to decide the matter within 180 days from the date of
the request for review of the 'Tmal decision," the employee may
file a civil action in federal district court.176
If binding arbitration is invoked prior to the employee's filing of
a request for review of a "fmal decision" with the EEOC, the arbi-
tration forum is controlling, and the EEOC may not intervene.
Once the arbitration award has been issued, either party to the
arbitration may fie exceptions to the arbitration award with the
FLRA.177 However, since the FLRA decision is a "final decision,"
EEOC review of the arbitration award may be obtained at this
point. The EEOC decision is judicially reviewable,178 and if the
EEOC fails to decide the matter within 180 days, the employee
167. Id. § 7702(a) (2).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975).
169. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7121(d), 7702(b) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
170. Id. § 7703(a) (1).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975).
172. 5 U.S.C-.A § 7703 (a) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
173. Id. § 7121(b) (3) (C).
174. Id. § 7121(d).
175. Diagram, supra note 150.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975).
177. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (West Supp. 1979).
178. Diagram supra note 150.
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may file a civil action in federal district court. 79
Permitting judicial and EEOC review of an arbitration award
reflects the Act's compliance with the recent landmark United
States Supreme Court decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver.180 The Court held that an employee does not forfeit his pri-
vate cause of action for employment discrimination'81 by initially
pursuing the matter to final arbitration under the nondiscrimina-
tion clause of a collective bargaining agreement. The employee is
not viewed as attempting to seek review of the arbitrator's deci-
sion by instituting an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of
the arbitral process.182 If the federal employee has taken his
grievance through binding arbitration, "the federal court should
consider the employee's claim de novo and admit the arbitral de-
cision as evidence and accord it such weight as the court deems
appropriate.' 83
Removal, Demotion and Suspension: Section 4303 and
Section 7512 Cases
There are two types of cases in which an employee may use ei-
ther the negotiated grievance procedure or the statutory appeal
procedure: 84 removals or demotions for unacceptable perform-
ance (section 4303 cases);185 and adverse actions such as remov-
als or suspensions for more than fourteen days, a reduction in
grade or pay,186 or furloughs of thirty days or less (section 7512
cases). 87 The employee exercises his option upon filing a timely
notice of appeal under the statutory appeal procedure, or by
tendering a timely written grievance under the provisions of the
negotiated grievance procedure.188 Diagram 3 illustrates the gen-
eral procedure for processing section 4303 and section 7512
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975).
180. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-16(c) (Supp. V 1975).
182. 415 U.S. at 56-58.
183. Id. at 59-60.
184. 5 U.S.C-.A §§ 7121(e) (1), 7701 (West Supp. 1979).
185. Id. § 4303.
186. Reductions in rank not involving a reduction in grade or pay are no longer
appealable adverse actions under the Act UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMIS-
SION, ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFoRM ACT OF 1978, FACT SHEET No. 2
(1978), reprinted in GOV'T Esmp. REL REP. 781:73, 75 (October 16, 1978).
187. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7512 (West Supp. 1979).
188. Id. § 7121(e)(1).
cases.
1 8 9
Assuming first that the employee elects to pursue the matter
under the negotiated grievance procedure and the grievance is
not satisfactorily settled, either the exclusive representative or
the agency-employer may invoke binding arbitration.190 The arbi-
trator must apply the same standards in deciding the case as
would have been applied if the case had instead been submitted
to the MSPB pursuant to a statutory appeal procedure.191 There-
fore, judicial review of an arbitration award is obtainable in the
same manner and under the same conditions as if the matter had
been decided by the MSPB.192 However, arbitration awards in-
volving section 4303 and section 7512 cases are not appealable to
the FLRA, as are other types of arbitration awards, 193 because of
this limited arbitral standard of inquiry.
Should the employee instead elect to raise the matter under the
statutory appeal procedure, the Act prescribes two separate stan-
dards of review for the MSPB to apply. In section 4303 cases, the
action of the agency-employer will be upheld by the MSPB if
such agency action is supported on the record by "substantial evi-
dence."194 All other agency actions (section 7512 cases) must
meet the tougher standard of "preponderance of the evidence" in
order to be sustained by the MSPB.19 Whether the matter goes
to binding arbitration or to the MSPB for resolution, the final de-
cision under either procedure is governed by the same standard
of judicial review.1 96 The reviewing court is directed to review the
189. Adapted from Diagram, supra note 150.
190. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7121(b) (3) (C) (West Supp. 1979).
191. Id. § 7121(e) (2). The obvious rationale for binding the arbitrator to the
statutory standards of review is to discourage forum shopping and to ensure con-
formity between arbitration decisions and those of the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB). S. REP. No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
192. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7121(f) (West Supp. 1979).
193. Id. § 7122(a).
194. Id. §§ 7121(e) (2), 7701(c) (1). The arbitrator must apply this same standard
in considering section 4303 cases brought under the negotiated grievance arbitra-
tion procedure.
195. Id. § 7701(c) (1) (B). The arbitrator must apply this same standard in con-
sidering section 7512 cases brought under the negotiated grievance arbitration pro-
cedure. See Heise, Adjudicatory Aspects of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
Workshop, Court of Claims 1979 National Judicial Conf., Wash., D.C. (May 1979),
reprinted in pertinent part in GoV'T EMp. REL REP. 811:9-11 (May 21, 1979), sug-
gesting that the constitutionality of this two-track standard of proof will no doubt
be challenged soon in the United States Court of Claims. The challenge will arise
because a separation for unacceptable performance is in effect an adverse action
depriving the employee of his right and title to his government position and, there-
fore, should be subject to the more stringent standard applicable to other adverse
actions, i.e., requiring a preponderance of the evidence to sustain the agency ac-
tion.
196. 5 U.S.CA.. §§ 7121(f), 7703(a) (West Supp. 1979).
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DIAGRAM 3---SECTION 4303 AND SECTION 7512 CASES
entire record of the proceedings and hold unlawful and set aside
any agency action, findings or conclusions found to be: "(1) arbi-
tary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by
law, rule or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported
by substantial evidence." 19 7
There exists considerable uncertainty as to the weight federal
courts will accord federal sector arbitration awards in section 4303
and section 7512 cases because of the Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver1 98 decision. In light of the Supreme Court's dicta, federal sec-
tor arbitrators may have to develop a more elaborate record,
apply stricter standards of evidence than they are accustomed to
in fashioning their awards, and cultivate a level of recognized ex-
pertise with respect to federal sector labor relations disputes in
order for their awards to be accorded any meaningful weight by
the federal judiciary. 9 9
Finally, the question has been raised whether the Director of
the Office of Personnel Management may also be able to obtain
judicial review of arbitration awards interpreting or having a sub-
stantial impact upon a civil service law, rule or regulation. 2 O0 Un-
197. Id. § 7703(c).198. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
199. Id. at 56-60.200. 5 U.S.C.. § 7703(d) (West Supp. 1979) gives the Drector of OPM the right
to obtain judicial review of any final order or decision of the MSPB interpreting a
doubtedly, if this practice is permitted by the federal judiciary, it
will further erode the already uncertain finality of federal sector
arbitration awards.
Mixed Cases
"Mixed cases" involve both an allegation of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination and an adverse action. As illustrated by Dia-
gram 4, the Act creates an incredibly complex procedure for
resolving "mixed cases." 201
DITA.Am 4-MXED CASES
The employee has the option of processing the matter under
the negotiated grievance procedure or pursuant to a statutory ap-
peal procedure. 20 2 If the employee elects to process the "mixed"
grievance under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective
bargaining agreement and the matter is not satisfactorily re-
solved, the employee has two options. The employee may request
the MSPB to review the pre-arbitration 'Tmal decision" or await
civil service law, rule or regulation affecting personnel management, and MSPB
decisions having a substantial impact on civil service laws, rules, regulations or
policy directives. The Act requires the Director to have unsuccessfully attempted
to initially petition the MSPB for reconsideration of its decision before the Direc-
tor may petition for judicial review.
201. Adapted from Diagram, .supra note 150.
202. 5 U.S.C.A § 7702 (West Supp. 1979).
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the union's invocation of binding arbitration.203 Once binding ar-
bitration has been invoked, however, the matter proceeds to arbi-
tration, the parties present their positions, and the arbitrator
fashions an appropriate award. Except in certain types of
cases, 204 either party to the arbitration may file exceptions to the
award with the FLRA, which will review the award and determine
whether or not it is deficient on private or federal sector
grounds.205 The FLRA's final decision is then appealable to the
MSPB as a "final decision" within the MSPB's jurisdiction.206
From this point on, the process is the same whether the em-
ployee elects to pursue the "mixed case" pursuant to the statu-
tory appeal procedure to the MSPB,207 or process the matter
under the negotiated grievance procedure. The only difference
between the two procedures is that under the statutory appeal
procedure there is an added feature. If the agency-employer fails
to resolve the matter within 120 days of initial presentment, the
employee may fie a civil action in federal court and be afforded a
trial de novo of the discrimination claim, 208 or he may appeal the
matter to the MSPB.209
For the remainder of this discussion of "mixed cases," it will be
assumed that the agency-employer made its decision within 120
days of initial presentment, or that, if it did not, the employee
elected to take an appeal to the MSPB rather than attempting to
invoke the judicial review machinery at this relatively early stage.
Hence, the case brought under the statutory appeal procedure
has progressed to the same stage of development as if it had been
processed under the negotiated grievance procedure-appeal to
the MSPB.
If the MSPB fails to decide the matter within 120 days of receipt
of the appeal, the employee may file a civil action in federal court
on the basis of the employment discrimination claim and will be
afforded a trial de novo of the case.210 Assuming the MSPB ren-
203. Id. § 7121(d).
204. Id. §§ 4303, 7512. Section 4303 and § 7512 cases are not appealable to the
FLRA as are other types of arbitration awards. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7122(a), (f) (West
Supp. 1979).
205. Id. § 7122(a).
206. Id. § 7121(d).
207. Id. §§ 7121 (a), 7702.
208. Id. §§ 7702(e) (1) (A), 7703(c).
209. Id. § 7702(e)(2).
210. Id. §§ 7702(e) (1) (A), 7703(b) (2), (c).
ders a decision within 120 days, the employee has the option of
petitioning the EEOC to "consider" the decision of the MSPB,211
or of seeking judicial review of the MSPB decision.212 This option
is exercisable within 30 days of the MSPB decision. If the judicial
review alternative is selected, the standard of review is not the
traditional one utilized in reviewing section 4303 and section 7512
cases2 13 since the employee's "mixed case" involves an employ-
ment discrimination claim. Instead, the employee is entitled to a
trial de novo by the reviewing court.2 14 If the employee instead
elects to petition the EEOC to "consider" the decision of the
MSPB, the EEOC has 30 days within which to decide whether or
not to "consider" the MSPB decision. 2 15
The Act prescribes that the total time frame for all remaining
steps shall not exceed 180 days. Once this period has elapsed, the
employee may file a civil action in federal court.216 Therefore, this
statutory time frame becomes an important factor in post-EEOC
review and cannot be neglected by reviewing agencies.
Should the EEOC decide not to "consider" the decision of the
MSPB, judicial review of the MSPB decision is immediately avail-
able.217 If the EEOC does decide to "consider" the MSPB deci-
sion, it must, within 60 days of this determination, "consider" the
entire record of the MSPB proceedings, take additional evidence
necessary to supplement the record, and either concur in the de-
cision of the MSPB or issue a contrary decision.2 18 If the EEOC
concurs in the MSPB decision, the decision of the MSPB consti-
tutes a judicially reviewable action affording the employee a trial
de novo of the case.2 19 However, if the EEOC issues a decision
contrary to that of the MSPB, the EEOC immediately refers the
matter to the MSPB. The MSPB then has 30 days within which
to: concur and adopt in whole the EEOC decision; reaffirm the in-
itial MSPB decision; or reaffirm the initial MSPB decision with re-
visions.22o
If the MSPB concurs and adopts in whole the EEOC decision,
211. Id. § 7702(b)(1).
212. Id. § 7703(a)(1).
213. Id. § 7703(c).
214. Id.
215. Id. § 7702(b) (2). A rather limited scope of review is utilized by the EEOC
in determining whether or not to accept an employee's petition for review of an
MSPB decision, culminating in a merits determination as step two of the EEOC
decision-making process once it decides whether to "consider" the MSPB deci-
sion. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7702(b) (3) (West Supp. 1979).
216. I. § 7702(e) (1) (C).
217. Id. § 7703(a)(1), (c).
218. Id. § 7702(b)(3).
219. Id. §§ 7702(b) (5) (A), 7703(a) (1), (b) (2), (c).
220. Id. § 7702(b) (5) (B), (c).
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the matter is judicially reviewable, and entitles the employee to a
trial de novo of the case.221 However, if the MSPB either reaf-
firms its previous decision or reaffirms with modifications, the
matter is immediately certified to a "Special Panel."222 Within 45
days of certification of the matter to the Special Panel, the Panel
must review the entire administrative record, permit the ag-
grieved employee to appear and present oral arguments, resolve
the issues in dispute, and issue a final Panel decision.223 The final
decision of the Special Panel is judicially reviewable, entitling the
employee to a trial de novo of the case by the reviewing court.224
CONCLUSION
A variety of criticisms have flourished in the wake of the enact-
ment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. One of the major
criticisms is that the subject matter of federal sector collective
bargaining is too limited. Because the most important terms and
conditions of employment are controlled by statute rather than
contract, 225 disputes over wages, hours, overtime, holidays, pen-
sions, vacations, insurance and the like are not arbitrable in the
federal sector. It is unlikely that Congress will attempt to expose
these important matters to collective bargaining in the federal
sector.
Another perceived difficulty with the Act is that, except for
claimed violations of constitutional rights such as employment
discrimination, judicial review of arbitration awards is not gener-
ally or easily obtainable.226 This corresponds with the private sec-
tor practice and achieves a desirable degree of finality in federal
sector labor relations dispute arbitration.
Hopefully, the Comptroller General has been precluded from
making after-the-fact determinations that an agency-employer
221. Id. §§ 7702(c), 7703(c).
222. Id. § 7702(d) (1), (d) (6) (A). The Special Panel is composed of a designated
EEOC member, MSPB member, and a Chairman of the Special Panel appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a six-year term.
223. Id. § 7702(d) (2) (A), (d) (4). Enforcement of the final Special Panel deci-
sion is the responsibility of the MSPB. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7702(d) (3) (West Supp. 1979).
224. Id. §§ 7702(d) (2) (A), 7703(c).
225. The conditions of employment which have been established pursuant to
Title V, U.S.C., 80 Stat. 378 (1970) constitute a comprehensive package of benefits,
preempting collective bargaining over such matters as wages, hours of work, insur-
ance, leave, retention and a variety of other basic conditions of employment.
226. D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 201 (1979).
cannot legally comply with an arbitration award containing a back
pay award that has either been upheld by or not appealed to the
FLRA.227 The legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 confirms the conclusion that the provisions for final and
binding arbitration were intended to make certain that the
awards of arbitrators, once they became final, were not subject to
further review by any other administrative body.228 However, the
finality of arbitration awards in the federal sector is precarious in
pure discrimination cases, section 4303 and section 7512 cases, and
"mixed cases. '229
There is also some question whether federal employees' consti-
tutional rights are adequately safeguarded by a system which re-
stricts employees to the arbitral forum, makes the utilization of
that forum dependent upon the union's willingness to. take cases
to arbitration, and precludes judicial review of awards except on
very narrow grounds.230 The FLRA must be sensitive to abuses of
the Act's framework for final and binding arbitration and should
either permit aggrieved employees to attack arbitration awards or
invoke arbitration themselves if the union has breached its duty
of fair representation.
Another criticism of the Act is that the federal government, as
an employer, seeks to enjoy its statutory protection against
strikes by its employees 23' without in turn affording them a mean-
ingful arbitration procedure with an effective final and binding
consequence in all cases. 232 It is clear that the Act creates a con-
fusing maze of forums empowered to hear and resolve federal
sector labor relations disputes in addition to reviewing supposed-
ly final and binding arbitration awards. Fortunately, the FLRA is
committed to the fundamental proposition that "the value and
strength of labor dispute arbitration depends upon the finality of
the arbitrator's decision. The disputing parties must be willing to
abide by the arbitrator's decision, and the courts and agencies au-
thorized to review the decision must be reluctant to interfere with
227. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7122(b) (West Supp. 1979).
228. See Conference Report on S. 2640, The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
124 CONG. REC. H11,624, H11,667 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978).
229. See Diagrams 2, 3 & 4 and accompanying text supra.
230. Grodin, Judicial Response to Public Sector Arbitration, in PUBLIC SECTOR
BARGAImG 240.41 (1979); see also Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Hunt-
ington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109 (1972) (New York Court of Appeals suggests
that where rights external to the negotiated agreement are involved, judicial re-
view might extend to determining whether the arbitration procedure was fair and
regular). This constitutes a heightened scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards not traditionally employed.
231. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7116(a) (7), (b) (7) (West Supp. 1979).
232. Gamser, Back-Seat Driving Behind the Back-Seat Driver: Arbitration in
the Federal Sector, Paoc. 31ST ANN. MTG. NAT'L AcAD. AnB. 273, 280 (1979).
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it. '"233 The FLRA, other agencies authorized to review arbitration
awards, and the federal courts should heed this sound principle of
effective labor dispute arbitration when confronted with arbitra-
tion award appeals, and apply only a minimal level of scrutiny to
such awards. If they fail to do so, the design for improved con-
tract administration and negotiations in the federal sector 234 and
the intended finality of federal sector labor dispute arbitration
will be seriously undermined by the abundant opportunities for
review of the final and binding arbitration award. Such a conse-
quence will undoubtably transform the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 into 'The Full Employment Act for the Federal Labor Re-
lations Bar."235
VAN ALLYN GooDwiN
233. Frazier, supra note 67, at 713.
234. See Miserendino, Arbitration in the Federal Service: The Regulation of
Remedies, 30 ARB. J. 129, 141 (1975): "[Tlhe appeal of an arbitration award to a
fourth-party interventionist and/or the modification of an award on the basis of
the fourth-party interventionist's interpretation results in the improper utilization
of the arbitral process ... "
235. Frazier, Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Government, 30 LAB.
L.J. 131, 136 (1979).

